109- Letter to the Town Board

I wrote the following letter to the Woodstock Town Board (emailed Tues night, Oct. 19, 2010) hours after learning that there was some confusion about when the members of the Town Board were supposed to have weighed in on the contents of the RUPCO housing project application. The letter is self-explanatory.

Dear Town Board,

There appears to be some confusion about when the Town Board was supposed to weigh in on water and sewer connection viability. It may be helpful to review pertinent parts of the DEIS and Findings Statement to get some clarity:

DEIS and FEIS

(As far as I can tell, the below delegation of responsibilities according to the DEIS did not change in the FEIS.)

In the Woodstock Commons DEIS, section 2.6.2 is called “Other Town Agencies.” The opening paragraph explains that “other town agencies have responsibilities with respect to review and approval of certain elements of the Woodstock Commons development...”

The section also reads: “The role of the Town Board involves the following considerations:

Acceptance of Offer of Dedication of Sanitary Sewer Force Main and Associated Grant of Easement” and a similar phrase for water system.

The body of the comment says that the town board “will be requested to act affirmatively.” This is what RUPCO asks every time it asks anything. It is phrased this way to suggest passively that the town board not analyze anything, but simply grant the request cited in each paragraph: to hook up.

The town water and sewer superintendent is listed as responsible ONLY for design approval and coordinating the timing of the work, the work of course being the hook up of the systems.

Everything else that the town board or water and sewer superintendent might have something to say about appears to be under the purview of the planning board, and it is not made clear which elements the water and sewer superintendent or the town board might have additional interest in. Can they comment on anything? Can the water and sewer superintendent be an interested party on the subject of property tax law? Probably not. But can the town board be an interested party on the subject of town services such as police and fire expenses? Yes, they could, but they should not be because the planning board is supposed to have that covered. What does the planning board NOT have covered? Nothing. It’s just that other interested agencies seem to have the discretion to say no, and the town board, according to RUPCO, does not have that discretion.

Kind of vague. How about, instead of trying to make sense of domains of responsibility, we look at sequence of decision-making, and maybe that will give us a clue.

FINDINGS STATEMENT

The Findings Statement was written, initially, by RUPCO, then edited and rewritten in part by Dara Trahan (and signed by Paul Shultis Jr with Planning Board comments taken into consideration.) Let us turn to one section that did not change significantly, or perhaps AT ALL from the first (RUPCO) version, to the last, (Trahan/Shultis) version:

On page 114 of the Final Findings Statement, find the section called “Matters to Be Decided.”

As far as I am aware, “To Be Decided” is the verb “to decide” conjugated in the future tense. The verb is “to decide,” NOT to scribble a signature without discretion or discernment.

Indeed, the opening paragraph of this section states that the lead agency acknowledges that implementation of the project “will require” [note the future tense there!] “permits, approvals, waivers and/or compliance determinations from not only the Planning Board but also a number of other government agencies following completion of the Planning Board’s environmental review process through issuance of this Findings Statement.”

Now, here again is a statement about the order of these decisions:

“The SEQRA Implementing Regulations require that each other involved agency makes its own SEQR Findings prior to granting the requested permit or authorization. However, the SEQRA Implementing Regulations require that the Lead Agency make its Findings first and do not allow another involved agency to make Findings or approve any aspect of the Proposed Action until the issuance of SEQR Findings by the Lead Agency.”

The Town Board cannot be BOTH an interested party expected to comment on the Planning Board’s domain of decision-making, AND an involved agency that must WAIT until the SEQR Findings by the lead agency have been issued.

Finally, in case you suspect that the heading “Matters to Be Decided” is a product of Dara Trahan’s editing, or of the Planning Board’s fancy, it’s not. “Matters to Be Decided,” in all of its future tense glory, was first written in the draft Findings Statement by RUPCO.

Thanks for your attention.

Robin Segal

1- Introduction

Hi, and thanks for reading. The purpose of this blog is to explore and remedy several problems in the proposed RUPCO housing development plan in Woodstock's Bradley Meadows. There should be one category that EVERYBODY agrees on, and that is safety. This project MUST be safe. And, safety is already defined by various transporation codes at the state and county and town level. Given these definitions and conditions at the intersection of Playhouse Lane and Route 212, I will show that the RUPCO project, as it is proposed at this time, will make an unsafe intersection even less safe.

The project has been under review for years, so why this blog, and why now? Even though the application and review process for the project has largely passed, I could not act prior to now because I am new in town. So here I am, offering what I believe is valuable information for the safety of Woodstock. It is never, or it SHOULD never be, too late to make our roads and our town SAFE.

I am not for the project or against it. I am in favor of, and in fact will act either to make sure the project keeps the people of Woodstock safe, or, if that is not possible, that the project be cancelled in its proposed location.

How to Navigate this Blog: Please read the blog posts in CHRONOLOGICAL order. The next blog entry (2) outlines the approval process for the project It's not very interesting, but I promise it is not too long. The next post (3) discusses the safety problems themselves. Three more posts (4, 5 and 6) clearly show why RUPCO's traffic analysis is in error, and the danger at this intersection that this error fails to recognize. The two posts after that (7 and 8) are about the sight distance at the intersection, which is another problem, although the two problems compound each other. The next post (9) draws some conclusions about all of this, and suggests some things we can do in the immediate future.

Once again, thank you for taking the time to read about this issue.

Update: I realize that my introduction is out of date. It is May 11, 2010, over half a year since I started this blog. You can see how my thoughts have progressed as I discovered more information about RUPCO. I am now, clearly, against this project, for so many reasons I cannot list them all in this intro.

108- Town Board Receives the Pass from Planning Board

My lawsuit is simmering on the back burner.  RUPCO is not talking about it. Neither is the town. It well could be dismissed. Meanwhile: Water and Sewer Hook Up for RUPCO's project.
That's where we are now.

We organized, we showed up, we rallied, we spoke.


RUPCO bullied the town board. Board members, well,  four out of five of them, expressed some kind of offense at RUPCO's manner and threatening statements.  Two days later, RUPCO took out a big "ad" in the form of a sour grapes letter in Woodstock Times.

During the meeting itself, what was discussed was whether the town has discretionary or ministerial authority to let RUPCO hook up to town water and town sewer.  Town Board says their authority is discretionary, RUPCO of course says it is ministerial.  This is the big question before the town now, and about which the town is consulting its attorney (curiously not Drayton Grant, but the other attorney who is NOT so involved with the details of RUPCO.)

What will be instructive is to see the Planning Board's treatment of water and sewer hookup, as lead agency, and the wording in the resolutions they passed.  Stay tuned for that in the next post.

107- Drayton Defends Herself. We get a new judge.

Judge Gilpatric used to serve on the Board of RUPCO, so he recused himself. Thank heavens. Thank you Judge Gilpatric.

Drayton wrote a letter to the new judge, defending her actions. The body of her letter:

This letter is to respond to a letter dated September 22, 2010, to Judge Gilpatric from Robin Segal, the pro se Petitioner in the above-referenced Article 78, which has now been assigned to you.


Ms. Segal is correct that I asked her for an extension of time to answer or move and that she granted my request.  I asked for the extension because the record was extensive and putting it in order, creating the index and copying it was going to take time, particularly because the matter had been under review for many years and the files needed to be carefully put in order, since they had been used by many people, with many FOIL requests from the public, including Ms. Segal. Another reason I asked for the extension was that I was going on vacation for two weeks, which I told her. 


During my conversation with Ms. Segal, I suggested she speak to an attorney, and she has admitted she did so.  I did nothing to suggest she should rely on me as her attorney or her advisor.  My conduct was in complete compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct, and in particular Rule 4.3


Nothing I did prevented Ms. Segal from acting within the period of the statute of limitations to submit an amended petition or commence a separate Article 78 proceeding based on the Planning Board issuance of the Special Use Permit and Site Plan approval for the project.  Nor did the extension of time to answer function to bar her from adding the landowner or the applicant for the project as parties to this proceeding.


My obligation as the attorney for the Respondents in this matter was to seek the objectives of my clients through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rule 1.1(c)(1).  I made the motion to dismiss a flawed Petition on the simplest, most expeditious grounds, and met my obligation to my clients.


Ms. Segal is angry and disappointed, but she is mistaken both in blaming me for representing my clients and for implying that I had a duty to help her avoid a defect in her case.  Instead, I had an obligation to prevent prejudice or damage to my clients.  Rule 1.1(c)(2).  Nothing I did was unethical in any way in my dealing with Ms. Segal.


Sincerely yours,


Grant & Lyons, LLP


by: Drayton Grant


I think there is not much more to do than to show you my response to the judge:

This letter is my response to Drayton Grant’s letter to you dated Oct. 4, 2010.  Ms. Grant is attempting to avoid addressing my statements opposing her behavior in this case.

Ms. Grant is correct in that she requested an extension of three weeks on August 17, 2010, and this was in addition to the extra time I granted the respondents initially without even being asked.  She is also correct that there were (and still are) many documents to put in order and this is why I specified some extra response time built right into my petition.  However, Ms. Grant filed a motion to dismiss my petition, and in her words, she made this motion “on the simplest, most expeditious grounds.”  I must ask, if the motion was as simple as my failure to name two additional respondents, why did Ms. Grant need SEVEN WEEKS to do this?

What Ms. Grant really did was conceal her true motives for requesting an extension, when she should and could have easily filed the motion to dismiss, even absent any extension.   She concealed her plan to file a motion to dismiss behind the work of preparing the record, which she clearly did not need time to prepare the record in order to file the motion to dismiss, since the motion is before the Court and the record remains unprepared, and Ms. Grant is no longer complaining that she needs more time for any reason.  This misrepresentation of fact was intentional on her part, for if she had filed the motion to dismiss quickly, I would have had time to amend my petition.  She calculated this timeline and for this reason alone, grouped the motion to dismiss, which was the ONLY thing she filed, with the preparation of “the record.”

Ms. Grant violated Rule 4.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS. She knowingly made a false statement of fact to me by telling me that she needed seven weeks, when in reality she only filed a simple motion.

Furthermore, I have significant evidence to prove that Ms. Grant was not at all serious about completing the preparation of “the record,” either by the time she filed the motion to dismiss or soon thereafter, confirming and demonstrating that her stated reason was simply a cover to run out the clock on the statute of limitations before filing her simple motion to dismiss.

Immediately after Ms. Grant asked for the extension, the Woodstock Planning Board had a meeting, but the meeting agenda had been set, and on that previously set agenda there were only a couple of weeks’ of meeting minutes to approve, out of over a year of unapproved meeting minutes.    Ms. Grant never said that I was in error in my understanding of her need for an extension.

The Planning Board, meeting only twice per month, and with an already crowded agenda, does make Ms. Grant’s task of preparing the record a longer one than one over which she had control.  However, I am in possession of Planning Board agendas for the meetings of September 2, September 16, September 30, and October 7.  All of these agendas including the approval of ALL outstanding meeting minutes, yet at each of these meetings, only a handful of meeting minutes were approved.  This shows that there was in fact NO requirement to have this particular record “prepared” in order to respond to my petition. 

Ms. Grant purposefully led me to believe, which belief I reiterated to Ms. Grant verbally and in an email, that the Planning Board’s slow process was the reason she needed the extension.  Therefore, I relied upon her assertion. The DRAFT New York State Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.1, includes these two sentences in the Comment section: “A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false.  Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements.”

Ms. Grant is without a doubt guilty of causing my reliance on her stated motives for requiring an extension, and this directly caused the statute of limitations to run out.  I did not look to for legal advice, but I did honestly and honorably rely on the truthfulness of her stated reasons for seeking more time.  Her failure is an ethical one, and clearly violates the Code of Ethics.  It should not be necessary for an attorney to point to a code of ethics and cite three sections that she did NOT violate.  One would expect and demand that every single section of the Code of Ethics is NOT violated.  The issue is the section that she did indeed violate.

Ms. Grant, in her letter to you, attempts to shift your attention away from her unnecessarily grouping her motion to dismiss with her rationale for an extension, and towards issues that have nothing to do with her offenses.  I never looked to Ms. Grant to advise me about that aspect of my petition.  Ms. Grant is deflecting my complaint about her ethics with irrelevant responses to non-issues. 

Ms. Grant labels me angry and disappointed.  She is right.  I am angry that she acted unethically, and disappointed that the Town of Woodstock would engage an attorney who would stoop to such sleazy behavior to avoid investigating safety hazards and other problems that will affect the welfare of our whole town.

I granted Ms. Grant an extension, but that extension was conditional on her honesty.  I admitted that the Planning Board’s involvement would down her work, and this made clear that I understood that Ms. Grant’s need for an extension required the record, in some way, AND the Planning Board’s involvement in some way.  Ms. Grant did not NEED an extension to file a motion to dismiss, as the fully prepared record was not required for her to do so, and the Planning Board’s involvement was not necessary for her to file the motion she filed.  Nor would she have needed seven weeks or even four weeks to file a motion to dismiss on what she labeled “the simplest, most expeditious grounds.” 

Because my extension to Ms. Grant was based on a misrepresented need, and because the motion to dismiss, which is all she filed, did not require the extension and could have been done prior to her vacation, I contend that Ms. Grant should not be entitled to this extension.  I further contend that the extension I agreed to was conditional, since I reasoned out the need in my email and she did not tell me in any way that I was in error in my belief.  I move that my extension to Ms. Grant be rescinded because it was obtained through the unethical behavior of misrepresentation.  Therefore, Ms. Grant filed her “simplest, most expeditious” motion to dismiss late, and therefore her motion should be dismissed, and her failure to respond in any ethical way to my petition constitutes non-response, which is grounds for your honor to decide in favor of my petition.

I realize that my argument to reject Ms. Grant’s motion as a late one might seem like a stretch, however it is important to punish misrepresentation, not simply reset the score at zero and start over, giving Ms. Grant the opportunity to behave more honestly the next time around.

Your honor, I urge you not to toss out my petition and reward Ms. Grant for her trickery.  My petition needs to be heard.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Robin Segal

Petitioner pro se

And that's where things are now, today, October 14, 2010.

106- Drayton Files a Motion

Drayton filed a motion to dismiss my petition, a motion she wrote later was based on the "simplest and most expeditious grounds."

So basically the question is, if this motion was SO simple, and it was, why did she need the extension to a total of about seven weeks to respond?

The answer is that she did not need the extension at all, she just wanted to run the clock out on the statute of limitations, so that I could not amend the petition to satisfy her objection, the basis of which formed her motion to dismiss.

The extension was a trick.  Nothing stopped her from making the motion to dismiss, and dealing with the extension later.

By the way, to date the "record" that Drayton needed to put in order still is not in order.  The planning board meeting minutes are still for the most part not approved.  Drayton does not seem to mind anymore though, now that her extension served its REAL purpose.

Sleazy.

I stood before the town board and explained this sleazy trickery to the board.  You can view it here:
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/9737321

Then I wrote a letter to the judge, Sept. 22:

Dear Judge Gilpatric:

I do not know how to respond formally to the communications I received from Woodstock attorney Drayton Grant, however I want to make clear that she lied and manipulated me into the legal technicality with which she seeks to have my petition dismissed.

I filed the petition on July 28 and the parties were served on July 29 and July 30.  On August 17, which was eighteen days after all parties were served, Ms. Grant telephoned me to ask for an extension to respond to my petition.  Before answering, I asked for her reasons.  She told me that “the record” was not ready.  Ms. Grant and I discussed the problem of “the record,” which is that the Woodstock Planning Board has not approved its meeting minutes in over a year, and this constitutes a lot of work.  In fact, I previously asked the Executive Director of the Committee on Open Government to address the Planning Board’s failure to make even draft minutes available for inspection within two weeks of meetings, in compliance with New York State Open Meeting Law.  That was in March, and so the problem of the Planning Board “record” was well known to the Town Board and the Planning Board.  Ms. Grant also told me that she was planning a vacation of two and a half weeks, starting only three days after the day of her phone call, and extending past the original response date. 

Before making a decision whether to grant an extension to Ms. Grant, I called an attorney and asked his advice.  He encouraged me to grant the extension since extensions are routine and that it was the courteous thing to do. 

I emailed Ms. Grant late that night, reviewing her reasons for requesting the extension.  (email record is attached.)  As it turns out, Ms. Grant’s rationale for wanting an extension was only to run the clock, so to speak, so that the statute of limitations would run out before I had a chance to name as defendants the two additional parties that Ms. Grant argues I should have named.  In fact, Ms. Grant’s motion to dismiss does not rely in any way on preparing the Planning Board’s “record,” and the response she produced in the form of a motion to dismiss did not require an extension of three weeks in addition to the extra time I gave the respondents in the original petition (which was about a week more than I was required to give them.) 

There was some confusion on my part about the difference between response date and return date, resulting in my understanding that Ms. Grant was asking for two extra weeks when really she was asking for three extra weeks.  We worked out that misunderstanding, which is documented in the attached emails, however in the process of doing so, Ms. Grant affirmed that she would “need” the extra week.

The only reason that Ms. Grant “needed” the extra week was to exceed the statute of limitations on my ability to add named parties to the list of respondents.  She lied about her reasons for “needing” an extension at all, knowing that I am not an attorney and am filing this petition pro se.

If I had not granted Ms. Grant her extension, perhaps she would have asked the court for the extension, and then would have been guilty of lying to the court about her reasons for “needing” the extension.  Because Ms. Grant cited the need to prepare “the record,” the burden should be on her to produce at least some work that does require “the record” in some small way.  She should not be rewarded for lying about needing to prepare “the record” only to buy time to let the statute of limitations run out.

In terms of the additional parties needing to be named, the two parties in question are the applicant (RUPCO,) and the owner of the land, (EVK Realty.)  Ms. Grant cites Section 1001 of the CPLR in order to define RUPCO and EVK as parties “who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action.”  Each of these parties has its own interest in seeing the housing project built, but neither of these parties has anything to do with the Town of Woodstock’s failure to do its job, and that failure is the only reason I brought this action against Woodstock.

EVK’s land has been under contract with RUPCO for over five years.  EVK understands that RUPCO is an applicant and is not guaranteed approval of the proposed housing project.  EVK has accepted this risk, and my petition is part of that risk.  Therefore, this petition does not subject EVK to any inequitable treatment.  In addition, EVK is bound for another 4.5 years under the current contract with RUPCO, therefore whether the project is built in one year or three years, EVK would not be permitted to sell the land to another buyer in any case.  Upon information and belief, some contiguous neighbors offered to purchase the land in question from EVK, but EVK was not able to sell because it is bound by the contract with RUPCO.

RUPCO was made aware of my petition on July 29, and I am in possession of videotape showing a RUPCO official looking at and commenting on the petition at the Planning Board Meeting during which the Board was served with the petition, calling the petition “amusing.”  Later in that meeting, after that official’s departure,  and also on videotape, there was a discussion of what the Planning Board would do with the Petition, and it was decided to send copies to Ms. Grant, as well as to “the applicant” (RUPCO.)  Therefore, RUPCO has been aware of this petition for as long as the Town of Woodstock has been aware of it, yet RUPCO chose not to intervene.

I would like to address Ms. Grant’s definition of RUPCO and EVK as indispensible parties, in that they are, according to CPLR Section 1001, “parties... who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action.”  RUPCO is an applicant before the Woodstock Planning Board.  There is a process, which must be followed.  Part of that process requires the Woodstock Planning Board, under the rules of SEQRA, to take a hard look at issues, particularly that have been raised as problematic.  By joining RUPCO as defendant, the Woodstock Planning Board’s hard look and RUPCO’s hard look become conjoined, and it is impossible to differentiate between the two.  To date, the problem with the Woodstock Planning Board’s assessment of RUPCO’s application materials is that where any sort of depth is needed to analyze problematic areas, the Woodstock Planning Board has not pressed RUPCO to answer questions or justify decisions.  While Woodstock Planning Board does not in theory have the same interests in this housing development that RUPCO has, in fact Woodstock Planning Board, through simple passivity, has let itself become captured in an economic sense by RUPCO’s financial, political, and legal domination.

Just as business captures the regulatory agencies that are supposed to regulate them, as in the case of BP Oil, which was “self-regulating,” Woodstock Planning Board has been captured by RUPCO in the application process of Woodstock Commons.  The Planning Board has failed to think independently and do its job to evaluate the information contained in RUPCO’s application materials.  The reason that Article 78 is the appropriate type of action to take against the Planning Board of Woodstock is because it is the town, not the applicant, that is guilty of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.  RUPCO has done nothing arbitrarily.  Everything RUPCO has done has been in the interest of building the housing project.  The Planning Board is supposed to evaluate what RUPCO brings to the table.  By joining RUPCO to the Planning Board, the independence of the Planning Board is intentionally compromised, which defeats the purpose of the Article 78 petition. 

The simpler reason that I did not name RUPCO and EVK Realty or any other party I could think of is because I did not know that parties other than the official/agency that is challenged needs to be named in an Article 78 petition, if in fact that is even true in all cases.  If your honor decides that it is necessary to name one or both of these parties, and subsequently excuse RUPCO from many causes of action and argue my case of regulatory capture, then of course I would be happy to amend the petition and serve one or both of these additional two parties.  Neither attorney reviewing my petition advised me to name both of those parties, so I did not.  The fact that the statute of limitations has been exceeded is entirely a function of Ms. Grant’s manipulation of my innocence, inexperience, and good will towards the Town of Woodstock and her personal request to enjoy her vacation as planned.

In addition to and in concert with Ms. Grant’s dishonesty and manipulation, the Planning Board has been going through the motions of approving meeting minutes at their last three meetings, although they have not achieved even ten percent of their goal of approval of over a year’s worth of meeting minutes.  This feeble effort does not reflect a “need” to prepare “the record” for a lawsuit.  It was a charade, a red herring, designed only to make it look like a response to my causes of action was forthcoming.  I include with this letter the three Planning Board meeting agendas, which show that many weeks of meeting minutes are on the agenda for approval. During the week that the Planning Board had not yet been granted the extension, the time allotted to approve two meetings’ of minutes was five minutes.  After the extension was granted, the time allotted to approve over twenty meetings’ of minutes was zero minutes, which is a clear sign that no effort or time was seriously planned to be spent approving meeting minutes and preparing “the record.”

In light of Ms. Grant’s dishonest behavior and bad will, I ask your honor to grant me an extension so that I may amend and add two parties to the petition, which is something that should have been well within my right to do had the respondents’ attorney not lied and manipulated me in order to avoid answering my petition.  If you do not think these two parties need to be added, then I would prefer not to add them at all since I think their exclusion does not affect them “inequitably.”

While I am not at all certain that there is any legal precedent for my request, I am familiar with the legal principle in criminal court, when a defense attorney requests an adjournment that the clock on the statute of limitations stops for the period of the adjournment.  This seems fair, and should be applied to this petition, particularly since the statute of limitations was exceeded by design and under false pretenses.  Just because I granted Ms. Grant an extension rather than forced her to request one from the court should not be reason to penalize me and to reward her manipulative and dishonest behavior.

Your honor, this is not a frivolous petition.  It concerns the public safety.  Car accidents have occurred at the site of the proposed project main access road, people have already been hurt, and the proposed development will exacerbate this safety hazard.  Just as the respondents have manipulated and lied to have my petition thrown out, they manipulated and lied in their approval of the housing development, ignoring the clear data showing this traffic hazard. 

Please do not reward Ms. Grant’s shameful behavior.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Robin Segal

Petitioner

105- "Drayton Goes on Vacation"

I filed the petition at the County Clerk's office July 28.  Respondents were served July 29 and July 30.  I gave respondents about a week more than I was required to give them by law, to respond.  August 17, phone rings. Drayton Grant, Woodstock's land use attorney, calling to ask me to grant her an extension to respond. 


For what reason? (I asked her that question.)


Her two reasons: a planned vacation, and she needed to put "the record" in order.  I said something about the planning board not having approved minutes from their meetings in over a year, and I understood.  She said nothing. She asked if I would like to consult an attorney before answering. I said yes.


I called an attorney who said yeah, sure, give her the extension, it's normal, and then she will not have to go to the judge for the extension, and that would make the judge dislike me, which is bad. 


So I wrote her an email that night, and what follows here is my and Drayton Grant's emails about the extension that I did grant her:

Later that night (early AM August 18):

Hello Drayton, thank you for your call today, in which you requested an extension to respond to my Article 78 Petition, index no. 10-3890, against Woodstock Planning Board, Town Board, Jeff Moran and Paul Shultis, Jr. You represented that you will be leaving on vacation this Friday, which is two days from now.  My petition was served nineteen days prior to your call.  You also told me that “the record” was not yet ready. 

I was not obligated to give respondents a month to respond, but I did, thinking it was more than fair.  I know that the planning board has not approved meeting minutes going back a year or so, since I personally brought this to the town’s attention five months ago, for the very reason that in the case of legal action, which was fully expected, the task of catching up will necessitate this very extension.

Still, I am happy to grant an extension of two weeks, moving the response day to the fourteenth of September.  This extension results in a response time of over six weeks, which should be ample.

Please let me know if I have to file any papers with the court or notify anybody.  If I do, please prepare the papers and I will sign them.

Thanks.

Robin Segal 

Drayton responds to me August 18, 9:39 AM:

Robin -

 

Thank you for this courtesy.  Do you have a fax or a number where a fax to you may be directed?  I will fax the judge's chambers that on consent, my response date is now September 14, and the return date is now September 22. 

 

Drayton

I reveal my inexperience in the legal world:

Drayton, it looks like I miscalculated.  I meant to give you an extension of two weeks, not three weeks, which would have put the return date, not the response date, at September 15, not Sept. 14, and certainly not Sept. 22.  I never specified a response date in my petition, and confused the two terms after you introduced response date and did not mention return date.  However, my intended extension of two weeks seems to be still not sufficient to accommodate your vacationing through Labor Day.  So, let us leave the return date at Sept. 22.

Here is a fax number for me: [edited out]. If you could email me the letter as well, that would be most helpful.

Thanks.

Robin

Drayton clarifies:

Robin -

 

Thank you again.  I appreciate your continuing courtesy here.  I did not mean to confuse you, but I certainly will need that week, and I had asked for it. 

 

I will send you the letter to the court clerk both ways. 

 

Drayton

There were a couple more after that, nothing of substance except a copy of the letter to the clerk saying Drayton and I agreed on the extension. 

So, what do you think happened next?  Do you think Drayton went on vacation AND used her extension to prepare the record?  I don't know, I kind of did, since that is what she said she was going to do....

104- Article 78 Against Woodstock

It's time to share the contents of my petition against Woodstock Planning/Town Boards.  I filed this petition July 28, and parties were served July 29 and July 30.  RUPCO became aware of the petition on July 29 in the form of Guy Kempe looking at it and calling it "amusing," at the Planning Board meeting. Anyway, I wrote it myself, so it's a little less boring than a normal lawsuit.  There are 22 causes of action, meaning 22 separate complaints against the planning board's adoption of the Woodstock Commons' Findings Statement.  The Findings Statement, by the way, was written first by RUPCO, then edited or "rewritten" by Dara Trahan, then "commented on" by the planning board, then SIGNED BY Paul Shultis, Jr., since the document is supposed to have been generated/authored by the Planning Board.

Here's my Petition (I do not include the first page which is the notice of petition, with all the technical stuff):

Article 78 Petition

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF ULSTER

VERIFIED PETITION and COMPLAINT

Index No.[filled in later]

     RJI No.[filled in later]

In the Matter of

ROBIN SEGAL

Petitioner - Plaintiff

For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR and

Declaratory Judgment

-          against –

WOODSTOCK, NY TOWN BOARD;

JEFF MORAN, WOODSTOCK, NY TOWN SUPERVISOR

WOODSTOCK, NY PLANNING BOARD

WOODSTOCK, NY PLANNING BOARD CHAIRMAN, PAUL SHULTIS, JR

Respondents - Defendants

 Petitioner/Plaintiff alleges as follows:

THE PARTIES

Petitioners – Plaintiffs

1.                Petitioner/Plaintiff Robin Segal is a property owner of and resident at 7 Evergreen Lane, Woodstock, NY.

Respondents – Defendants

2.                Respondent/Defendant is Woodstock, NY Planning Board, chaired by  Paul Shultis, Jr.

VENUE

3.               This proceeding is properly venued in Ulster County as that is the county in which Woodstock, New York Planning Board meets and works, where its jurisdiction lies, and is the location where the determination seeking to be annulled was made.

RELEVANT REGULATIONS

4.               The New York State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), directs all state and local agencies to act as a steward of the environment and that in their regulation of the activities of individuals and corporations they shall do so that a due consideration is given to preventing environmental damage”. ECL ' Section 8-0103(9).

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDING

5.               This is a combined proceeding brought pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Laws and Rules to annul a July 01, 2010 determination by the Woodstock, NY Planning Board to adopt the Environmental Quality Review Findings Statement for Woodstock Commons; SPR 05- 322 & SUP 05-361 (Exhibit 1).

6.               Woodstock Planning Board adopted the Environmental Quality Review Findings Statement despite its containing statements of intended action that if carried out will be unlawful, rendering adoption of these statements based on error of law.

7.               Woodstock Planning Board adopted the Environmental Quality Review Findings Statement despite its containing statements of intended action that are physically or legally impossible to carry out, making their adoption arbitrary and capricious.

8.               Woodstock Planning Board adopted the Environmental Quality Review Findings Statement despite its containing several statements of fact that are internally contradictory, making their adoption ambiguous, and therefore arbitrary and capricious.

9.               Woodstock Planning Board adopted the Environmental Quality Review Findings Statement despite its containing several statements of fact that are plainly in error, making their adoption not based on fact, and therefore arbitrary and capricious.

10.           Woodstock Planning Board is comprised of seven members, minus one who recused himself from hearing the application for this project. Three of the remaining six members have clear conflicts of interest with the applicant, and therefore all decisions rendered by the Planning Board should be set aside.

PROJECT BACKGROUND

11.           The Findings Statement concerns a proposal by Rural Ulster Preservation Company, Inc. (“RUPCO”) as applicant (the “Applicant” or “Project Sponsor”) before the Town of Woodstock Planning Board for development of “Woodstock Commons” (the “Project”), an affordable, intergenerational housing community for seniors and families, consisting of a total of 52 units of rental housing, a caretaker’s unit, and supporting improvements within a development envelope (or maximum disturbance area) of 9.640 acres in the northerly and primarily upland portion of a single 28.026-acre parcel (the “Project Site”).

12.           The Project Site, designated as Section 27.55, Block 2, Lot 3, on the Tax Maps of the Town of Woodstock, is owned in fee by EVK Realty, LLC, and subject of an Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of Real Property executed by the owner and RUPCO.

13.           Prior to the Woodstock Planning Board becoming Lead Agency in RUPCO’s application to build Woodstock Commons affordable housing project, Woodstock Town appointed an Affordable Housing Committee to study and make recommendations to the Town Board about options for developing affordable housing. This committee has existing minutes and other documents of record from years 2003 and 2004.

14.           The Affordable Housing Committee, which had already accepted the advice and input from RUPCO, recommended that the town of Woodstock develop accessory apartments, and convert existing buildings to affordable housing, as well as pursue the currently planned and applied for affordable housing project called Woodstock Commons.

15.           The Town of Woodstock did very little towards the other two options, putting an emphasis and undue burden on the Woodstock Commons project’s ability and duty to provide affordable housing in the Town of Woodstock.

16.           Beginning in 2004, The Town of Woodstock and the Woodstock Planning Board, now chaired by Paul Shultis, Jr. have followed all of the required steps in the SEQR process, including but not limited to establishing the Planning Board as lead agency, establishing the project as a Type I action, creating a scoping document, accepting, after comments and consideration, a Draft Environmental Impact Statement, and then accepting, after a requisite period set forth for comments and consideration but not necessarily considering, the public’s comments, a Final Environmental Impact Statement, and finally, the very Findings Statement that plaintiff hereby alleges was adopted in significant part arbitrarily and capriciously, and in significant part based on error of law.

AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

17.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 16 as if fully set forth.

18.           Woodstock Planning Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in accepting this statement on page 3 of the Findings Statement: “The senior units will consist of 20 one-bedroom units exclusively for people age 55 or older with incomes ranging from below 30% to a maximum of 60% of adjusted mean income (“AMI”) as established annually by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.”

19.           AMI is in fact defined as Area Median Income, not Adjusted Mean Income.  The difference between area and average, and between median and mean, certainly make adoption of this wrongly defined term arbitrary and capricious.

20.           In its correct definition, “Area” means county. What does the Woodstock Planning Board think “adjusted” means?  This is an unstated and therefore arbitrary definition of an income threshold meant to be used to define eligibility for housing in Woodstock Commons.

21.           Mean is not equal to median. Mean means average, and median means middle data point in a data set. This difference also will lead to a discrepancy between the intended and the actually adopted term “AMI”.

22.           Furthermore, since the Findings Document originally was drafted by RUPCO, and only edited and barely altered by the Planning Board’s professional planner, this also raises the question of whether RUPCO even knows the meaning of “AMI.”  If RUPCO is indeed attempting to adjust household income in some way, in what way is this being done? 

23.           If the “A” in “AMI” stands for “Adjusted,” not “Area,” as RUPCO and the Woodstock Planning Board seem to think, then that brings up another question: what area is RUPCO drawing from if not the “Area” defined by HUD in the true “Area Median Income” definition?

24.           Likewise with the difference between “Median” and “Mean.” If in fact RUPCO is calculating some mean, or average income, instead of median income, this will lead to the wrong standards being used, and therefore will also make the housing ineligible to receive tax credits for affordable housing construction, if the error produces an upper eligibility threshold on the high side.  If the error is on the low side, persons of higher incomes will incorrectly be denied housing because of the income requirement having been defined and calculated incorrectly. 

25.           It is vital that all parties involved in bringing Woodstock Commons to Woodstock understand the terms and the calculations used to determine eligibility for this affordable housing, and this is clearly not the case.  Absent a well-defined and transparent formula for eligibility, surely persons interpreting “AMI” using the correct and the incorrect defining terms will come into conflict, which is the result of this arbitrarily and capriciously defined term, AMI.

26.           Due to this arbitrarily and capriciously defined term, AMI, Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside.

AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

27.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 26 as if fully set forth.

28.           Woodstock Planning Board acted illegally and arbitrarily and capriciously in accepting this statement on page 3 of the Findings Statement: “Preference will be given to qualifying “creative artists” in the leasing of 12 of the units.”

29.           Woodstock Planning Board wrongly replaced “artist” with “creative artist.”  The term “artist” has a legal definition, and it is not within Woodstock’s right to change the term that has been defined by Congress.  The correct term is “artist” and the correct definition of an artist is one “who is involved in artistic or literary activities.”

30.           The set aside for artists’ housing is made possible by the 2008 Housing and Economic Recovery Act (H.R. 3221-231).
Section 3004, called “Other Simplification and Reform of Low-Income Housing Tax Incentives” includes:
(g) CLARIFICATION OF GENERAL PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT.—
Subsection (g) of section 42 is amended by adding at the end of the following new paragraph:
“(9) CLARIFICATION OF GENERAL PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT.—
A project does not fail to meet the general public use requirement solely because of occupancy restrictions or preferences that favor tenants—
“(A) with special needs,
“(B) who are members of a specified group under a Federal program or State program or policy that supports housing for such a specified group, or
“(C) who are involved in artistic or literary activities.”

31.           This text means that anybody who can show that they are “involved in artistic or literary activities” can qualify as an artist. RUPCO and Woodstock are not authorized to redefine or narrow this definition in order to make this set-aside favor any one category of artist over another category of artist.

32.           It is also possible that Woodstock wishes to broaden the term “artist.”  The Creative Artist Agency, which is the first website that comes up when googling “creative artist,” includes the agency for sports personalities.  Is Woodstock Commons going to grant preference to applications from professional athletes?

33.           I personally sent a letter to the Woodstock Planning Board, calling their attention to the Congressional definition of “artist” as it applies to housing in Woodstock Commons.  (Exhibit 2) Despite this call to attention, Woodstock Planning Board persisted in defining the term “artist” in a way other than that required by the act that makes the artist housing set aside possible. The contents of this letter also were submitted, by me, in a set of twenty-two comments,(Exhibit 3) during the comment period following Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Final Environmental Impact Statement.

34.           Woodstock Planning Board’s adoption of the Findings Statement was arbitrary and capricious because it did not use a legal definition of “artist,” which is a group that will have preference in obtaining housing, which makes their adoption of the Findings Statement arbitrary and capricious.

35.           Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside.

AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

36.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 35 as if fully set forth.

37.           Woodstock Planning Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in accepting the Findings Statement that specifies that a non-existent corporate entity, one with no legal standing to own anything, will own the housing complex known as Woodstock Commons.

38.           The ownership entity, in the Findings Statement defined as “Playhouse and Elwynn Associates, LLP,” does not at present exist, nor is it on the verge of being created.

39.           Two legal entities with similar names do exist, and they are “Playhouse and Elwynn Limited Partnership,” and “Playhouse and Elwynn Associates LLC.”

40.           Playhouse and Elwynn Limited Partnership has been described by RUPCO as the ultimate owner of Woodstock Commons, and NY Division of Corporation papers to this effect substantiate this claim.  Playhouse and Elwynn Associates LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of RUPCO, and is the general partner of Playhouse and Elwynn Limited Partnership.

41.           Playhouse and Elwynn Associates LLP is a nonexistent and ambiguous corporate name that can never exist unless the existing Playhouse and Elwynn Associates LLC ceases to exist because the former is a confusing form of the latter and would be disallowed by the New York Division of Corporations.

42.           Furthermore, in New York State, the corporate form LLP constitutes a Professional Limited Liability Partnership, meaning a partnership of a group of like service professionals.  This is not the nature of what RUPCO described as the owner of Woodstock Commons, and in fact, one of the partners of the intended owner is a subsidiary of RUPCO itself, making the corporate form impossible to achieve given the nature of the general partner, as named.

43.           It is unclear whether this nonexistent and ambiguous corporate name was supposed to be either of the two existing corporate names, since in the past RUPCO, which was the body that authored the first draft of the Woodstock Planning Board’s Findings Statement, used a nonexistent corporate name for several years, in violation of their right.

44.           I personally called the Woodstock Planning Board’s attention to RUPCO’s unauthorized use of the other corporate name, (Woodstock Commons Limited Partnership,) (Exhibit 4) in a letter dated March 1, 2010. (Exhibit 5) Woodstock Planning Board therefore should have at least verified when their professional planner claimed authorship of the Findings Statement, that the corporate name was in fact the correct one.  The contents of this letter also were submitted, by me, (Exhibit 3) during the comment period following Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Final Environmental Impact Statement.  Woodstock Planning Board failed to note that RUPCO’s proposed owner of Woodstock Commons is a nonexistent corporate entity with no legal standing.

45.           Woodstock Planning Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not confirming the proper name of the ownership entity of Woodstock Commons.

46.           Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since the document names a nonexistent and disallowed corporate entity as owner of Woodstock Commons.

AS AND FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

47.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 46 as if fully set forth.

48.           Woodstock Planning Board has not studied the degrading effects of the bicycle paths in the wetlands that RUPCO claims will NOT be developed, therefore its acceptance of plan to build paths for pedestrians and bicycles is arbitrary and capricious.

49.           Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since no study of the degradation of wetlands as a result of bicycle paths has been performed.

AS AND FOR A FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

50.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 49 as if fully set forth.

51.           Woodstock Planning Board, on page 20 of the Findings Statement, uses a future decision (the Town Board’s affirmative vote to allow the housing project to access both water and sewer district services) to support a past decision to site the housing in its currently planned location.

52.           Woodstock Planning Board assumes that water and sewer will be available to the housing, which would have necessitated such a determination prior to counting on the availability of those utility services, not after the decision to accept the Findings Statement was made.

53.           Woodstock Planning Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously by inverting the order of decisions necessary to rely on the water and sewer utilities to make a case for siting the housing where it currently is proposed.

54.           Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since reliance on water and sewer, which is arbitrary and capricious, and premature, is a cornerstone of the site selection.

AS AND FOR A SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

55.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 54 as if fully set forth.

56.           Woodstock Planning Board, on page 22 of Findings Statement, in a category called Environmental Setting, Impacts and Mitigation Measures, lists thirteen categories of man-made environmental factors, but this list excludes noise.

57.           Woodstock Planning Board accepts RUPCO’s table of construction equipment decibel levels, and otherwise does not question noise pollution.

58.           I personally delivered letters to each Woodstock Planning Board members on March 1, 2010, raising the issue of noise pollution from the planned bandstand in the housing development’s outdoor area. (Exhibit 6) Woodstock Planning Board ignored my letter, and the issue of noise pollution. The contents of this letter were also submitted, by me, during the comment period following Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Final Environmental Impact Statement.

59.           In addition to this noise source, RUPCO failed to produce decibel levels for geothermal well drilling, while geothermal wells, up to fifty-three of them at three hundred feet each, will be drilled on the project site.  No noise estimate was produced by any party (except me) showing the noise disturbance during the construction period.  (Exhibit 7) The contents of this letter also were submitted, by me, (Exhibit 3) during the comment period following Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Final Environmental Impact Statement.  Fifty-three wells multiplied by three hundred feet is over three miles of drilling, and RUPCO responded to this by asking whether anybody minded some other neighbors drilling their geothermal well years earlier.

60.           Woodstock Planning Board did not ask RUPCO to produce any noise estimates for the geothermal well drilling, nor for the bandstand music noise, in fact, a video I recorded shows RUPCO asking Woodstock Planning Board whether there were any complaints during a brief geothermal well drilling in the same neighborhood, as though the absence of recorded noise complaints in one project suggests that the noise level in an entirely different project featuring approximately 20 times the number of wells would not be a problem. (Video reference that cannot be transcribed because many people spoke at the same time: http://www.youtube.com/user/brandybottlebates#p/u/11/WBEAmIabKhM )

61.           Woodstock Planning Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously by cursorily dismissing the significant noise sources that will be produced by the project both during construction, from the geothermal well drilling, and during the life of the project, from the bandstand.

62.           Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since failure to measure, estimate, or even consider noise disturbance, during construction and in the future blatantly disregards the auditory environment of neighborhood residents.

AS AND FOR A SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

63.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 62 as if fully set forth.

64.           Woodstock Planning Board has not independently studied the relationship between pedestrian safety and Woodstock’s land subdivision minor road design standards, for which, upon understanding and belief, waivers have been sought and received.

65.           A project engineer, meaning RUPCO’s engineer, opined that Playhouse Lane’s failure to meet the minimum required horizontal curvature and vertical curvature, did not pose a safety problem. In addition, various Woodstock town officials who are not engineers, (the highway superintendent, the building inspector, and the volunteer fire chief) also approved the waivers, but an independent highway or transportation engineer did not.

66.           I do not know why the (late) building inspector was asked for his opinion on horizontal road curvature or vertical road curvature, or what the value of his opinion is or was, but the record reflects his approval of the waiver.  The record does not, but should reflect that his son is chair of the Woodstock Planning Board.

67.           Woodstock Planning Board’s failure to have the horizontal curvature and vertical curvature waivers on Playhouse Lane studied by independent engineers (not RUPCO engineers and not a Woodstock Planning Board member’s relative, or non-engineers) shows that Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of these waivers is arbitrary and capricious, and that Woodstock Planning Board did not take a hard look at the issue of pedestrian safety on Playhouse Lane.  There is no documentation that this issue was studied, but only some meetings occurred, apparently, and only one letter, apparently by the fire chief AND the building inspector AND the highway superintendent, declare their joint approval of these waivers.

68.           Horizontal curvature and vertical curvature standards exist to protect both pedestrians and vehicles.  Woodstock Planning Board did not hire a qualified specialist such as an independent highway engineer to assess the waiver, but simply relied on three, with regard to this very technical engineering specialty, laypeople, relying on their titles, not their qualifications.

69.           Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Playhouse Lane, the main access road to Woodstock Commons, fails horizontal curvature and vertical curvature standards, and a waiver has not shown to be justified by any qualified and unbiased engineer. 

AS AND FOR AN EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

70.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 69 as if fully set forth.

71.           Woodstock Planning Board, on page 55 of the Findings Statement, claims that “Pedestrian access will be provided by both a pedestrian walkway to Playhouse Lane and a natural surface walking trail to Bradley Meadows shopping plaza,” even though the natural surface walking trail to Bradley Meadows will be useless unless an easement from Bradley Meadows shopping plaza property is granted to Woodstock Commons residents and all other pedestrians, and upon information and belief, it is not within Woodstock Planning Board’s scope to assume that this easement will happen and it has not yet been granted as of this writing.

72.           Absent the easement through Bradley Meadows shopping plaza, it is incorrect and misleading to call the pedestrian walkway at Woodstock Commons “access,” since it accesses nothing but private property with no easement, current or guaranteed in the future.

73.           Likewise, the pedestrian access to Playhouse Lane is simply a walkway out to Playhouse Lane, where no consideration was given to pedestrian traffic or safety.

74.           The Playhouse Lane studies concerned only vehicular traffic.  Being a neighbor and pedestrian user of Playhouse Lane on a daily basis, I paid special attention to Woodstock Planning Board’s disregard for pedestrian movement along Playhouse Lane.

75.           Playhouse Lane is already a narrow road, and no pedestrian walkways currently exist, which now is not problematic since there is so little vehicular traffic that there are never two cars passing one another and a pedestrian.

76.           Woodstock Commons will produce considerable traffic, and pedestrian access along Playhouse Lane will suffer, but Woodstock Planning Board did not quantify or comment on or even study this detrimental effect of added vehicular traffic.

77.           Woodstock Planning Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it stated that pedestrians at Woodstock Commons would have pedestrian access when in fact pedestrians will have only safe and well-designed walkways on the property developed by RUPCO.  Woodstock Planning Board failed to take a hard look at the logic of the proposed pedestrian routes from housing to town center. Once beyond the property on which Woodstock Commons is applying to be built, pedestrians will be, as far as we know now, trespassing or walking along a road that has failed its horizontal curvature design standard, and has no clear shoulder upon which to walk.

78.           Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since pedestrian access from and to Woodstock Commons, which is central to this project being located in the hamlet itself, is both premature to declare, and questionable as to its safety.

AS AND FOR A NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

79.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 78 as if fully set forth.

80.           Woodstock Planning Board has omitted entirely the requirement for any study of pedestrian safety.  All mention of pedestrian safety appears scattered throughout only select other topics.

81.           This results in the omission of pedestrian safety concerns when Woodstock Planning Board wishes to avoid the topic.  For example, the following statement and the text that follows it considers pedestrian traffic and vehicular traffic, but not pedestrian safety:

82.           “The Woodstock Commons EIS addresses the probable effects of the proposed development on Traffic and Transportation including consideration of vehicular traffic, pedestrian traffic and public transportation.” (Exhibit 1, p. 69)

83.           Woodstock Planning Board accepted a study from the applicant that declared that there were a small number of pedestrians observed during the AM and PM rush hours. What the study failed to specify is that the AM and PM rush hours refer to vehicular rush hours, which are defined by rushing (in a vehicle) to and from work.  Because pedestrians do not rush to and from work on foot during the same rush periods, pedestrian movement is spread out throughout the day. Woodstock Planning Board accepted a study that could not have derived this because observation of pedestrian activity was admittedly conducted only during two brief periods.

84.           I can personally attest to the fact that I see more people walking on Playhouse Lane between 7 AM and 8 AM than at any other time of day, as this is canine rush hour, but not vehicular rush hour, according to the traffic study experts. 

85.           Woodstock Planning Board did not take a hard look at pedestrian safety, but only a cursory look, by accepting a very incomplete study based on erroneous assumptions of when people walk in the neighborhood, and therefore its judgment of this matter is arbitrary and capricious.

86.           Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board did not take a hard look at pedestrian safety around Woodstock Commons.

AS AND FOR A TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

87.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 86 as if fully set forth.

88.           Woodstock Planning Board accepted a flawed “inventory of existing roadway network conditions including conduct of detailed turning movement counts at ten (10) intersections within the vicinity of the Project Site during peak traffic hours.” (Exhibit 1, p. 70)

89.           Although the methodology used was standard, the study failed to capture a very large number of cars posing a hazard in the main intersection that constitutes the primary access (existing) road to the housing project.

90.           When I showed this omission to Woodstock Planning Board, in a letter submitted March 1, 2010, (Exhibit 8) I was told that the hazardous car movements did not fit within the methodology that was used, and therefore their existence and hazard would not be counted in the detailed study.

91.           Woodstock Planning Board accepted the omission of the cars backing into the intersection from the parking lot because RUPCO engineer explained that when cars back into the intersection, it is not an intersection, which, I can only assume, means that when cars drive in the same intersection, it is an intersection. This logic is so twisted that it can only be understood as a result of a great effort to avoid counting the parked cars entering and exiting the intersection as intersection traffic.

92.           The reason that there was non-standard traffic in the intersection in the first place is because the intersection violates acceptable access management rules for intersections, so the cars posing the danger are not supposed to be there in the first place.  That is the reason there was no place for them in the standard methodology.  Standard methodologies are useful when situations are standard, as opposed to non-standard and unsafe situations.

93.           In this case, it is not additional traffic that would introduce a hazard in the intersection, but rather an existing traffic hazard that would be unacceptably exacerbated by the addition of the traffic projected by the project engineers.

94.           Woodstock Planning Board failed to take a hard look at the cars backing out into the intersection of Playhouse Lane and Route 212 by omitting them from the intersection data, claiming that they did not fit within the standard methodology.  This exclusion of data was arbitrary and capricious, since nonstandard data can only be considered by altering standard study methodology.

95.           Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since critical traffic and safety data were thrown out for the sake of unjustified convenience and simplification, and nothing more.

AS AND FOR AN ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

96.           Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 95 as if fully set forth.

97.           Woodstock Planning Board uses an undisclosed number of its own members’ personal familiarity with the parking lot at Playhouse Lane and Route 212 in Woodstock, NY to make a judgment about an increased level of traffic driving into the intersection that originated at Woodstock Commons.

98.           “The Planning Board members have personal familiarity with the intersection and how it is used and do not find this off-site and pre-existing condition significantly impacted by the Woodstock Commons project,.”(Exhibit 1, p.72)

99.           Woodstock Planning Board admits that there is a hazard resulting from the cars backing out of the parking lot, into the intersection, but that this hazard is not enough even to count these cars in the rush hour period car count, let alone the traffic simulation of that very intersection.

100.      Woodstock Planning Board members’ familiarity with any parking lot or intersection is no more than any other layperson’s familiarity with any other traffic movement. The voluntary service of Planning Board members does not qualify them to make judgments about complex traffic patterns that will only emerge in the future, and must now be simulated by traffic professionals, of which there are none serving on Woodstock Planning Board.

101.      In addition to not being traffic engineers or traffic experts of any kind, nor being involved in any traffic or road safety issues in their routine duties on Woodstock Planning Board, the members also claim, further on page 72, referencing additional traffic from Woodstock Commons entering the intersection, that “nor does it pose significant safety threat based upon the administrative record.”

102.      The administrative record referred to excludes accidents in which there was no personal injury, vehicular damage less than $1000 and that were not reported.  In addition to this record, which in just the last two years has seen at least three accidents in this intersection that are recorded in an administrative record, three more accidents were “nonreported” and so were not in the official administrative record. 

103.      The additional three, and therefore six accidents in an 18-month period were made known to at least one member of Woodstock Planning Board.  Woodstock Planning Board has rejected this additional evidence, which is comprised of anecdotes and photographs.  The town newspaper, Woodstock Times, dedicated a front-page story to the safety, or lack thereof, at this intersection.  This article interviewed many people including the (past) chief of police.  Yet, Woodstock Planning Board would rather rely on its own members’ casual familiarity with this intersection, not only to judge its safety in the present, but also to, not all together as a board, but separately and silently, to simulate its safety level after the addition of hundreds of trips per day and a vehicular turning traffic (as opposed to driving straight through) increase of about five hundred percent.

104.      Woodstock Planning Board did the opposite of take a hard look at the projected additional traffic’s effect on the intersection’s safety.  The professional engineers hired by the applicant could not come to any reasonable conclusions since it was they who refused to count the parking lot cars in the first place. Woodstock Planning Board members are non-expert town residents who substituted their casual observations for an unacceptable absence of work by credentialed and experienced experts.

105.      Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since critical traffic and safety data were guessed at, which is the definition of arbitrary and capricious.

AS AND FOR A TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

106.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 105 as if fully set forth.

107.      Woodstock Planning Board claims to have analyzed “the use, width and configurations of the roads, legal title easements, right-of-ways and filed map depictions; all as detailed within the EIS,” (Exhibit 1, p. 74) however the EIS contains two contradictory widths of Playhouse Lane, the only access road to the housing project.

108.      It is critical that one of those measurements disqualifies the projected traffic volume as too great; meaning that the road is not wide enough for the amount of traffic that it will carry, according to the design standards subscribed to by Woodstock Planning Board and RUPCO.

109.      The contradictory stated widths of Playhouse lane, in one place cited by one engineer as “23 feet” and in another place by another engineer as “17-20 feet” was contained in a letter sent to all members of Woodstock Planning Board.

110.      One member of Woodstock Planning Board asked RUPCO representatives how wide Playhouse Lane is, and the RUPCO attorney said, “I don’t know where it is in the document.” He then changed the subject to ownership of Playhouse Lane, and laughed nervously. (Internet video reference: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDNQcGS8LZo)

111.      No further questions or attention ever was paid to this road width contradiction.

112.      Woodstock Planning Board not only did not take a hard look at the contradictory stated widths of Playhouse Lane, but its members did not think that it was strange that engineers who can design roads cannot measure the width of a road, even after I wrote a letter to Woodstock Planning Board about this March 1, 2010. (Exhibit 9)

113.      I personally hired my neighbors, who are 6 years old and 7 years old, to measure the road’s width in several places. What this shows is that if children in first and second grade can solve a contradiction with a tape measure, then Woodstock Planning Board did not take a hard look at this contradiction.

114.      Furthermore, this measurement contradiction was meaningful in that the larger (and false) measurement exempted the project from having to widen the road, while the smaller (true) measurement will jeopardize the project since the applicant does not have the right to widen the road, as it is not within the land to be developed by the applicant.

115.      Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board knowingly ignored an internal contradiction in the Environmental Impact Statement that suggests that the access road to the housing project is illegally narrow.

AS AND FOR A THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

116.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 115 as if fully set forth.

117.      Woodstock Planning Board mischaracterized a section of road, labeling it an intersection, and beyond that, its analysis was faulty since it misidentified the road section in the first place.

118.      This faulty analysis produced, not surprisingly, an erroneous conclusion about the safety at the very place the housing project access road is proposed to meet the existing town road.

119.      Furthermore, Woodstock Planning Board did not even study this issue until I personally brought up the issue and supplied the access management guidelines that Woodstock Planning Board claims in the Finding Statement that it used.

120.      One cannot reach a reasonable conclusion if one starts with faulty assumptions.  In this case, Woodstock Planning Board characterized a bend in a road as an intersection, and based on that error alone, all analysis concerning access management in that region of the road was misleading.

121.      It is relevant that upon information and belief, no independent traffic analyst or other expert was retained to study this raised concern.  It was the work of the Woodstock Planning Board or its professional planner, herself not a traffic specialist, but who wrote the final draft of the Findings Statement.  The hard look that was supposed to happen is nowhere documented, and the decision to call this bend in the road an intersection was arbitrary and capricious.

122.       Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board did not take a hard look at the safety at the access road’s meeting the town road, but only quoted a document that was presented to the Planning Board at a late date (by me), and cited a different conclusion, based on an erroneous assumption.

AS AND FOR A FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

123.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 122 as if fully set forth.

124.      Woodstock Planning Board claims that there is ample water in the hamlet water district to serve Woodstock commons(Exhibit 1, p. 79) however Woodstock Planning Board fails to analyze the effect on day-to-day neighborhood water pressure that tripling the current neighborhood demand would have on the contiguous and near contiguous neighbors.

125.      This failure constitutes an arbitrary and capricious leap from the opinion that there is enough water over all, to there being high enough water pressure delivered to neighborhood houses.

126.      A simulation of firefighting water pressure was presented to Woodstock Planning Board, (Exhibit 1, p. 80) and this simulation concluded that while nearby houses would experience a failing water pressure for firefighting, the firefighting water pressure at Woodstock Commons would be adequate.

127.      It is beyond arbitrary and capricious that Woodstock Planning Board neither was concerned that neighbors might be without firefighting capacity as a result of demand at Woodstock Commons.  It hardly takes a hard look to infer that RUPCO has announced that neighbors will suffer severely decreased water pressure, below the standard used in New York State, (Ten States Standards,) under the firefighting scenario.

128.      In addition to the alarming firefighting scenario, Woodstock Planning Board failed to perform, and perhaps to even wonder about whether day-to-day water pressure would fall below the normal accepted window of 60-80 PSI, or below the minimum acceptable 35 PSI, according to the Ten States Standards.

129.      Once again, Woodstock Planning Board failed to take a hard look at the negative effects of potential decreased water pressure as a result of tripling demand in the neighborhood.

130.      More troubling than these omissions is the inclusion of very detailed water demand and pressure simulations of a Woodstock water system expansion from 1995.  It is a glaring and insulting study that only highlights the absence of such a study/simulation of the current proposed housing project and associated water system expansion.

131.      Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board did not take a hard look at the effect of a tripling of water demand on day-to-day water pressure in neighboring properties.

AS AND FOR A FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

132.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 131 as if fully set forth.

133.      Woodstock Planning Board vaguely gauges proposed Woodstock Commons residents’ drain on services, (Exhibit 1, p. 86) beginning with the arbitrary and capricious assumption that there is currently residual service capacity.

134.      The Findings Statement continues: “there is no significant requirement for expansion experienced in these Community Facilities and Services and no significant adverse impact with respect to these services has been identified.” 

135.      RUPCO’s rationale, in the EIS, for not requiring any expansion of services is based on the assumption that residents of the proposed Woodstock Commons will volunteer to fill whatever need there is.

136.      This assumption is no excuse for not taking a hard look at town services and facilities, rather than relying on volunteer services to keep service levels for other town residents at or near current levels.

137.      There are vacancies on volunteer boards and have been for a number of months, with no volunteers to fill them.  The library, a perfect example, has an enormous budget, and several full time salaries, which are a very large percentage of the town budget.  The library is normally a place where people who do not have computers sit to use the internet. 

138.      An affordable housing project will, based on its residents’ limited income, bring additional library users to the town, and this already expensive resource with not enough volunteers, will become even more expensive, since the users are counted and based on them, budgets are floated and voted upon.

139.      The reason that the future population of Woodstock Commons has not indicated a need for additional services as a result of adverse impacts on existing services is because no adverse impacts ever were brought into any discussion.  The applicant simply stated, under any scenario, that the residents of Woodstock Commons would volunteer wherever their presence would present a drain on services.  This assumption is based on nothing but wishful thinking.

140.       Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board relied on an assumption of volunteer service to fill the gap where currently salaried jobs will not be adequate to render service to the town’s additional residents.

AS AND FOR A SIXTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

141.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 140 as if fully set forth.

142.      Woodstock Planning Board contends, “RUPCO has engaged in continuing discussion with the owner of the planned Woodstock Commons premises, EVK Realty, LLC, regarding the reservation of a pedestrian easement by the latter across a portion of the Bradley Meadows shopping plaza.

143.      This makes no sense.  The easement should be negotiated between RUPCO (the applicant) and the owner of Bradley Meadows shopping Plaza, which is Mountain Meadow Realty, LLC, not EVK Realty, LLC. 

144.      The Findings Statement already stated that such negotiations were ongoing.  EVK Realty is identified as the owner of the planned Woodstock Commons premises.  If and when the project moves forward, a Limited Partnership will be the owner of the planned Woodstock Commons premises.  It makes no sense to be in negotiations with the seller of the land.  The seller of the land will not own any land over which to grant an easement.  The seller of the land will have sold the land, and will possess money, not land.  Moreover, the seller of the land does not own the adjacent land over which this easement is said to be negotiated.

145.      If it is here suggested that EVK Realty, LLC owns the Bradley Meadows Shopping Plaza in addition to the acreage to be used for Woodstock Commons, then EVK Realty, LLC should be identified as such in this paragraph.

146.      It is entirely fruitless for RUPCO to be in “continuing discussion” about an easement with EVK Realty, LLC, since neither RUPCO nor EVK Realty, LLC appears to own the property over which the desired pedestrian easement will exist.

147.      Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board does not seem to be aware of which parties own which land, and that awareness, at the very least, should be a litmus test for taking a hard look at something as simple as identifying the parties with whom to negotiate an easement.

AS AND FOR A SEVENTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

148.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 147 as if fully set forth.

149.      Woodstock Planning Board reports, (Exhibit 1, p. 95) that Woodstock Commons, as a result of New York Real Property Tax Law 581-A, will increase taxes, however the magnitude of this increase was derived in a most arbitrary and capricious way.

150.      Woodstock Planning Board, parroting RUPCO, calls the reported tax increase the “worst case scenario” with regard to tax increases, however this claim is based on nothing more than a projected operating income, since projected operating income is the basis of the taxable value of the property under RPTL 581-A.

151.      The “worst-case scenario,” however, occurs when net operating income is zero, and therefore taxes levied from the housing project also are zero. RUPCO obfuscated the calculations deriving the expected tax levy from Woodstock Commons, and Woodstock Planning Board accepted the misnamed “worst-case scenario.” 

152.      The 2010 decision in EPO-Stovroff Apartments, L.P., v. Town of Cheektowaga upheld the reduction in taxable property value of an affordable housing project from the town tax assessor’s $220,000 to a mere $6,000.

153.      This 2010 decision shows that RUPCO’s and therefore Woodstock Planning Board’s “worst case scenario” is not worst at all, but simply an arbitrary and capricious designation of taxable income.

154.      In addition to this case law, I sent a letter to each member of Woodstock Planning Board on March 1, 2010, (Exhibit 10) explaining why RUPCO’s worst case scenario was not the worst case at all, and in fact was most likely inflating the expected tax revenue generated from Woodstock Commons. The contents of this letter were also submitted, by me, (Exhibit 3) during the comment period following Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Final Environmental Impact Statement.

155.      Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board failed to take a hard look at the potential tax increase expected by Woodstock Commons, despite being shown calculations in letters addressed to each of them, and choosing arbitrarily and capriciously to consider only opinions supporting the figures in RUPCO’s application.

AS AND FOR AN EIGHTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

156.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 155 as if fully set forth.

157.       Woodstock Planning Board accepted a biased analysis of the effect of surrounding property value due to the future presence of Woodstock Commons.

158.      The properties compared to Woodstock Commons are the Birches at Saugerties in the Town of Saugerties; Chamber Court in the Town of Ulster; Birchwood Village in the City of Kingston; and Elsie’s Meadow in the Town of Shawangunk.  These “comparable” affordable housing properties are not comparable at all.

159.      Three of four of these “comparable” affordable housing properties are senior-only housing, and the fourth is mixed family and senior affordable housing.  It is well known that seniors of any income bracket do not commit crimes or other disturbances such as loud noise with the same frequency or intensity as younger populations do.  This appraisal, performed for RUPCO, is clearly biased.

160.      In addition, I personally have had my house, which is one street over from Playhouse Lane, the proposed access road, appraised twice in the last six months, and in both appraisals, the existence of Woodstock Commons was responsible for diminishing the value of my property. (Exhibit 11)

161.      Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board failed to take a hard look at the potential decrease in value of homes surrounding the proposed housing development, and a hard look is necessary in order to assess whether the reasonably supported expected decrease in property value is the best policy for the town and for property owners.

AS AND FOR A NINETEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

162.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 161 as if fully set forth.

163.      Woodstock Planning Board failed to analyze reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.  Woodstock Planning Board analyzed alternatives including the “no build” alternative, and several versions of Woodstock Commons, however SEQRA Section 617.9(b)(5)(v), requires “a description and evaluation of the range of reasonable alternatives to the action that are feasible, considering the objectives and capabilities of the project sponsor. “  Included in these alternatives are alternative: sites, design, timing, and types of action.  None of these alternatives, except for the “no action” alternative, were analyzed, except for some variations of the action that Woodstock Planning Board has adopted.

164.      RUPCO’s general goal as a New York charitable organization is to provide affordable housing to residents of Ulster County. RUPCO does this both by building new housing for sale and rent, and managing existing housing, for example Section 8 housing.

165.      Woodstock’s Affordable Housing Committee, in its recommendation to the Town Board, in 2004, recommended three separate paths to developing affordable housing, and a large construction project such as Woodstock Commons was only one of those potential paths. (exhibit 12) The two other paths were changes to the town’s zoning to allow property owners to create accessory apartments to be rented as affordable housing, and the town’s refurbishing and offering this existing housing as affordable housing.

166.      The alternative consisting of existing housing being refurbished by the town surely could have been an opportunity for applicant RUPCO to manage affordable housing in Woodstock, since this housing would require management.

167.      The very least that should have been performed within the SEQRA process, under the hard look test, was a cursory examination on the part of Woodstock Planning Board to include this recommended refurbished housing path/alternative to the proposed action, since it could well have assigned to the applicant a central role in such an alternative.

168.      According to SEQRA Section 617.9, Woodstock Planning Board must “evaluate all reasonable alternatives,” and clearly, this was not done.

169.      Woodstock Planning Board’s decision to support the applicant’s action without also analyzing even the alternative that was suggested by the Woodstock Affordable Housing Committee, the very body that justified the applicant to proceed in the first place with the Woodstock Commons action, was arbitrary and capricious.

170.      Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board failed to take a hard look at, besides the “no action” alternative in the proposed location, all, most, or even some reasonably different alternatives to the proposed action.

AS AND FOR A TWENTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

171.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 170 as if fully set forth.

172.      Woodstock Planning Board, in a general statement, has shown its proclivity to shy away from contentious topics when it claims, (Exhibit 1, p. 117) that “there has been public controversy, both for and against the Woodstock Commons project, since its inception and that such controversy will persist following adoption of this Findings Statement. This type of controversy is ordinary, customary and to be expected in the Town of Woodstock and the determinations made within this Findings Statement have not been influenced one way or the other as a result of such controversy.”

173.      It is meaningless to state that controversy is “for and against” a project.  The definition of controversy is the presence of both “for” AND “against” positions, and that these positions are represented vocally and in conflict with one another.

174.      It is disturbing that Woodstock Planning Board has not been influenced one way or another as a result of such controversy.  Controversy, by its very nature, isolates the kernel of the issue, helping to clarify and distill what is superfluous or agreed upon, from what is debatable.  To fail to be influenced by controversy, in any form, is to ignore complaints, evidence produced by collective society, discussion, and the public will on both sides.  To fail to be influenced by controversy is shameful.  It is also an admission of a failure to place the general public sentiment in the mix of information relevant to investigating and analyzing the applicant’s proposed action.

175.      More than any other statement, the one quoted above demonstrates the intellectual vacuum in which, and the investigatory blinkers with which Woodstock Planning Board has armed itself against public sentiment, and indicates a general attitude of arbitrariness and capriciousness towards issues about which there is public disagreement.

176.      Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board failed to listen for, hear, and consider expression of ideas that are controversial in public.

AS AND FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

177.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 176 as if fully set forth.

178.      Woodstock Planning Board (Exhibit 1, p. 118)  “finds that none of the comments result in the identification of areas of environmental concern which would require substantive project modification or a change of circumstance requiring the Lead Agency to substantively modify the Decision to certify, adopt and issue the Woodstock Commons Findings Statement.”

179.      Woodstock Planning Board then cites a list of twenty-five public comment areas, which it defines as the areas that were addressed.  Missing from this list is SAFETY.

180.      I personally submitted in writing, spoke about at public hearings, wrote about by invitation in the town’s newspaper, wrote letters to the editor about, and discussed with Woodstock Planning Board members, concerns for safety at several intersections near the project site.  The town newspaper also printed a front-page story about the intersection that will see a great increase in traffic as a result of Woodstock Commons being built, and the focus of this article was safety (Exhibit 13).

181.      For Woodstock Planning Board to omit the topic of safety from the issue categories that were considered is tantamount to an admission that safety was not thoroughly analyzed, as I have shown previously in this petition.

182.      Despite the production of traffic analyses, car counts, road measurements, and accident accounts, all part of the submitted record, Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board, by admission through omission, failed to analyze the public’s comments and challenges on the topic of safety.

183.      Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since Woodstock Planning Board, by admission through omission, failed to analyze the public’s comments on the topic of safety.

AS AND FOR A TWENTY-SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

THE TOWN OF WOODSTOCK PLANNING BOARD

184.      Petitioner/Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 183 as if fully set forth.

185.      Woodstock Planning Board is comprised of seven volunteer members, one of whom recused himself from considering this particular action.  Of the remaining six members, three have conflicts of interest with RUPCO, the project applicant.

186.      The first conflict is Laurie Ylvisaker, a realtor who is a member of the Ulster County Board of Realtors, which is one of RUPCO’s official partners, and this is stated on RUPCO’s website.  Ylvisaker, in a letter to the editor of the local newspaper, in 2009, expressed her willingness to and enthusiasm in selling homes to first-time homebuyers with RUPCO’s assistance. (Exhibit 14).

187.      The two other members of Woodstock Planning Board with conflicts of interest are Paul Shultis, Jr, who is chair of Woodstock Planning Board, and David Corbett.  Both of these members served on the Woodstock Affordable Housing Committee during the years spanning 2002-2004, and this is the committee that invited RUPCO to Woodstock to apply to build affordable housing in the town.

188.      There is clearly a bias in favor of RUPCO, and an impossibility of these two Woodstock Planning Board members to remain impartial, given their previous committee’s positive slant and invitation.

189.      Woodstock Planning Board’s acceptance of the Findings Statement must be set aside since three of six Woodstock Planning Board members have conflicts of interest with RUPCO.  These three members’ votes should be annulled, which leaves only three members, and these votes, even if all in favor of adopting the Findings Statement, do not comprise a quorum.

190.      No previous application has been made for the requested relief.  WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully requests that judgment be entered pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules:

191.      VACATING and setting aside Respondent’s determination of July 1, 2010, accepting the Woodstock Commons Findings Statement;

192.      GRANTING such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

ROBIN SEGAL

Petitioner, pro se

Dated: July 28, 2010